

3 MAY 1982

BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS FOR DISCUSSION  
POLITICAL ACTION  
SECRETARY HAIG MEETING, 3 MAY 1982

1. The Concept of Political Action Offensive

25X6 — Agree strongly with the concept of political action based on a marshalling of our public and private resources. It is a very critical consideration to recognize that there needs to be a proper balance [redacted] This can only be achieved when an absolute commitment to this concept is recognized and stated in the top levels of the Government. (N.B. This has been a failing to date.)

— The case for public/private support is well stated in the attached speech.

25X1 -- CIA's role. Our role should be derivative but complement a total program. [redacted]

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
— There is not one simple solution. The proposed "American Political Foundation", included in the attached speech, is an excellent initiative, representing one of several initiatives that should be ultimately encouraged.

2. Existing Resources and Programs.


— The USG has not regularly provided a comprehensive focus to "communication activities" supported by various elements of the government (ICA, State, AID, CIA) as well as quasi private elements such as RFE/RL, since the Eisenhower days. Several steps have been taken which will help, noted in the State memo. We must establish the priorities and policy commitments and then ensure that resources are available to support those activities which are or should be undertaken directly by the USG. These activities, to date, have been functioning as orphans in a hostile bureaucratic world. Several examples should be cited:

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
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- AID has been the only federal element which has provided support to AFL/CIO's international institutes. Without a strong endorsement from the national security level these programs have been subject to straightline budgeting for virtually five years and the ratio of overhead to programs has been shifted from 30%-70% to 70%-30%.

- AFL/CIO has no significant resources available for a European labor institute. 


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- RFE/RL leads a bureaucratic life that resembles the perils of Pauline. Despite considerable rhetoric in Washington to provide full support to these radios, I still receive considerable disquieting information concerning both the radios and the potential hazards of the Pell Amendment. This disquietude suggests that national security level attention may be required to ensure that these programs receive the significantly expanded resources and proper bureaucratic support that are necessary for us to meet the challenge of change in Eastern Europe in the 1980's.

- Other examples abound that are a part of existing programs which fail to be perceived by the national security structure as national security related. One last example would be the need for significantly expanded ICA programs which parallel those activities which had previously been funded by the Department of State's Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs and which are now part of the ICA budget. An expansion of these programs would permit us to fulfill some of the challenges cited in the attached speech and an expansion should be considered in a national security context. Wick would be helped in his budgetary efforts if this were a "national security" item.

- A projection for resource commitments should be requested. It will only be realistic if the interagency commitment to the program is established. Otherwise the projections will come in the "nick and dime" level. Aside from the requirements for radio expansion, I suspect  package would go a long way to meet the immediate needs in this category of ongoing programs. Many of these activities are labor intensive.

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
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3. What Can Be Done to Improve Our Capability?

— The above discussion has covered two specific points:

— Buildup of existing USG capabilities.

— Establishment of an American Political Foundation. The American Political Foundation is an inspired idea and derives its legacy from such forerunners as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Conrad Adenaur Stiftung. They also



— The timing for the two initiatives above should be:

— Expansion of USG programs—immediately. These activities exist. They simply need to expand. When I talked to [redacted]

[redacted] last week he underscored that the best way to move forward rapidly is to build on existing structures and capabilities. New initiatives and openings are essential and should be developed but we should not wait for them to come into being.

-- American Political Foundation. The State projection for including this in the FY 84 Congressional budget is probably a realistic projection. Such an effort requires careful coordination, Congressional considerations, monetary considerations and a number of political pitfalls to avoid.

— I would recommend a third track be pushed simultaneously. I define this as the private track. A lot can be done through the expansion of federal programs. Some, and possibly all, of the work may ultimately be able to be done by the American Political Foundation, but the problem is that some things need to be done now and we are at least eighteen months away, if not longer, from an effective functioning political foundation. Therefore, I suggest that we encourage a group of private philanthropists be called together to meet with the President. He could seek their support to initiate an immediate "communication program" with Europe designed to reestablish dialogue and collaboration on all levels between the European and American societies. This would also permit the establishment immediately of activities such as proposed by [redacted] in the attached memorandum. This work must be done privately and it must be done now. I discussed this with the DCI, [redacted] and we all believed that this was the only step that could be taken to invigorate this type of dialogue on a short time basis. Such a

consortium could be set up to meet the immediate need and could continue on either as an independent program or eventually be folded into the American Political Foundation. Much would depend on the compatibility of the independent programs. The President's speech and his trip provide an excellent backdrop to the initiation of these programs. My proposal for a private group is designed to fill the void until the bureaucracy can play catchup ball. I became graphically aware of the need for strengthening our dialogue with Europe on the basis of my last three week visit to five European countries.

Attached to my memorandum are the following documents:

1. Tab A: A memorandum for the record from [redacted] which provides background for the 6 May meeting. This memorandum has as an attachment the paper which State proposes to discuss.

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2. Tab B: A second attachment is an outline for a "Vigorous Information Program" prepared by [redacted] Attached to that is an International Communications Policy Scenario which I drafted in December 1981 and provides some background to my thinking.

25X1

This may be more than you have time to read but it gives you some background into the evaluation of the paper which will be discussed this afternoon.

Attachments  
As Stated

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SUBJECT: Meeting on Political Action/Offensive May 3rd at 4:30

For the meeting on political action/offensive, we have prepared the attached paper.

We suggest that at the meeting we address three subjects:

1. The concept of political action/offensive
2. Existing resources and programs
3. What can be done to improve our capabilities

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- o The President's November 18 speech on arms control timed to preempt Brezhnev in Bonn was a classic example of a "political action" with major impact.
- o State and the NSC, working with the European Parliament and the Congress, put together International Afghanistan Day. We have established on-going interagency working groups and programs to: " shape European attitudes, expose Soviet active measures, deal with the nuclear freeze issue, and inform the world on Central America.
- o The Defense Department got out an excellent booklet on Soviet military power. All of us have been giving speeches on the Soviet threat.
- o USICA has undertaken path-breaking initiatives through the use of television ("Let Poland be Poland") and new vigor in getting out information about our policies and the Soviet Union.
- o BIB and VOA are working with all of us on a plan dramatically to modernize the broadcasting capabilities of RFE/RL and VOA.

This is a solid start, but much more needs to be done.

-- Within the government, we are poorly staffed and organized to conduct effective political action. We now have a sound structure on the information side under Charlie Wick's leadership. But we are weak in our ability to generate political initiatives and conduct political campaigns, combining government and private efforts here and abroad.

-- Some of our existing capabilities have serious weaknesses. Our radios reach only a fraction of the Soviet Union.

In general there is serious underfunding for political, as opposed to military and economic competition, in part because the concept and importance of political action has not been understood.

-- The Soviet budget for these activities is around \$4-5 billion. American political action is a critical contribution to our national security and deserves funds on the same priority as national defense. For example our radios play a major role in encouraging peaceful change in Eastern Europe weakening the unity of the Warsaw Pact and

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compelling the Soviet Union to devote enormous military resources to policing its own allies and own people. The cost of RFE/RL is less than one B-1 bomber.

-- We lack the kind of government-funded, but private political foundation which the Germans have and which could conduct political training, organizing and provide financial support.

As Soviet dissident Lev Kopelev has said: Soviets put in ring heavy boxer with big muscles; America puts in tiny ballet dancer.

### III. What Can Be Done

Going on the international political offensive has the potential of being the major mark the Reagan Administration can make on the history of America's role in the world. It can be the vehicle for reforging a domestic foreign policy consensus on the basis of traditional American values - a consensus that the Carter human rights policy attempted to reestablish but failed, due to its policy of moral double standard. An American political offensive can underscore the continuing vitality of the ideals of freedom and democratic-capitalism, ideals which can capture the imaginations of the world's millions -- if we only hold them forth for all to see.

Organizing ourselves to conduct such an offensive and providing resources must be among our highest priorities. We must admit that the State Department has not yet been geared up to the enormity of this task. Our regional bureaus all too often operate in a reactive mode with traditional diplomatic concerns rather than broader political strategy foremost on their minds.

Nevertheless, we have begun to make some constructive changes. We have a small core of political action officers in Under Secretary's Eagleburger's office. And we are considering the establishment within State of a substantially larger and permanent mechanism for political action. The sole purpose of this staff would be to keep the U.S. on the political offensive, working more closely with the CIA, ICA and the other agencies from the perspective of influencing foreign publics: a perspective less encumbered by the traditional diplomatic concerns of not offending State's usual constituency -- foreign governments.

We already have the interagency groups on specific areas for political action which I mentioned earlier, and should consider the formation of new ones where needed.

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In the same vein, we need high-level mechanisms to maximize our common potential. We already have the information SIG which Charlie Wick chairs, and the NSPG for covert action. Both are critical and obviously should continue. We also believe that a periodic review of the overall political action effort would be useful (policy initiatives-information-covert action-private sector). We could consider whether we have succeeded in shifting from a reactive mode to a broad political offensive, and what are our priorities for future efforts and resources. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs seems to us the logical person to call together such a political action group. Frankly, we care less about who chairs it than that it have the broad scope we have set forth.

We also need to develop government-private sector links and mechanisms, and we need to launch our political offensive at the Presidential level with specific Presidential initiatives. Working closely with the NSC, we have designed the President's address for Parliament on June 8th to achieve this purpose. We have attached a preliminary draft so that you can see both the themes and specific initiatives he would launch.

The most important of the initiatives is the establishment of a U.S. political foundation. This proposal is now before the President for decision. It has strong bipartisan support including Lane Kirkland, Chuck Manatt and other Democratic Party leaders, the Chamber of Commerce and owes much to Bill Brock's efforts over the years. Pete McPherson has found some USAID money for the study to establish the foundation. Even the "New York Times" has called for the establishment of such a foundation.

We want to offer political aid, training and organization to democratic forces struggling for influence in communist and non-communist countries alike. Next time a Portugal is ready for political change, we need not rely on the German foundations to provide a politically organized, pro-Western, democratic alternative to a communist takeover.

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We know that members of our staff have been discussing "political action" for months with serious interest, a common perception that we were moving in the right direction but that much more needed to be done. That is why we thought it would be useful to have a meeting at our level. You undoubtedly will have additional ideas and proposals to make. We look forward to the discussion.

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